Discute-se com possíveis distinções entre pluralismo e pluralidade. Tais conceitos são revisitados em Filosofia, Política, Sociologia e Direito. Procura-se detectar especificidades da ideia de pluralidade e de pluralismo aplicados à ética, à moral e ao Direito, no passado e em nossos dias. Indaga-se a respeito da atualidade ou não de certas obras de É. Durkheim, um dos fundadores da Sociologia, para esclarecer o debate contemporâneo sobre questões referentes à pluralidade e ao pluralismo.

A metáfora do ciborgue é um constructo epistêmico relativamente recente. Publicado em 1985, o Cyborg Manifesto, de Donna Haraway, mobilizou o imaginário acadêmico-cultural apontando para a emergência do híbrido de máquina e organismo, indicando o nó produzido nas linhas de sentido históricas, vivenciadas na fusão entre técnicas (bio-info-cogno) e nós, os organismos vivos; tornando-se, assim, matriz da filosofia ciborgue. Academicamente, coube a Thierry Hoquet anatomizar o ciborgue na obra Filosofia Ciborgue: pensar contra dualismos (publicada em Português no ano de 2019 (...) e, no original, em 2011), fenômeno este que aparece no século XX com características próprias, desafiando categorias epistemológicas estanques, cuja pretensão é definir os limites entre o humano e o não humano, entre o que é próprio da natureza e o que é parte da cultura. (shrink)

Resenha de: CHAMAYOU, Grégoire. Teoria do drone. Tradução de Célia Euvaldo. São Paulo: Cosac Naify, 2015.

Este dossiê representa a continuidade de um projecto que tem procurado debater publi­camente o património dos agentes ligados à produção e circulação do livro. Centrando-se nos espólios dos livreiros, a introdução problematizante e os depoimentos procuram dis­cutir o seu carácter invisível enquanto objecto de pesquisa, salvaguarda e divulgação. Há, então, uma reflexão que urge fazer, à semelhança do que ocorre com o património dos edi­tores (arquivos históricos e não só), no sentido de reconhecer o estatuto patrimonial e histó­rico dos acervos (...) dos livreiros e das livrarias enquanto espaços fundamentais da construção da cultura impressa e da história do livro e da edição. Mas é também urgente conferir ao debate um cunho de acção e de cooperação inter-institucional que suscitem uma sensibili­dade política e o aparecimento de possibilidades concretas de salvamento, recolha e depó­sito sistemático de um dos mais fundamentais elementos da memória colectiva escrita. Os depoimentos referidos são de Fátima Ribeiro de Medeiros e dos Livreiros da Sá da Costa. (shrink)

Trata-se de uma análise das afinidades da filosofia de Schopenhauer (1788-1860) no pensamento de Emil Cioran (1911-1995). Autor influente na Romênia desde o século XIX, Schopenhauer é considerado uma das principais referências de Cioran. As fichas de leituras, cartas, expressões e os temas abordados por Cioran constituem uma gama de argumentos para aproximação do filósofo romeno ao filósofo do pessimismo.

De 1964 a 1985 o Brasil viveu sob um regime de governo ditatorial que de acordo com a historiografia mais recente foi sustentado, em grande parte, pela própria sociedade civil (MELO, 2012; COMISSÃO, 2014). Mais recentemente, a partir dos anos 1980, cresce o movimento de criação de espaços de memória corporativos com o objetivo de tornar pública a trajetória histórica das empresas (COSTA; SARAIVA, 2011). Dentre estes espaços, adquire relevância os Centros de Memória e documentação como lugares de armazenamento e (...) lembrança de memória organizacional, que ajudam a construir simbolicamente a imagem organizacional e a fornecer um senso de coerência e trajetória linear (RIBEIRO; BARBOSA, 2007). Neste contexto, e com base na documentação disponibilizada pela Comissão Nacional da Verdade, a presente pesquisa tem por objetivo identificar como o Museu Histórico da Fundação Bradesco retrata (ou deixa de retratar) o relacionamento da empresa Bradesco com o governo brasileiro no período da ditadura civil-militar. FIRMS, BRAZILIAN CIVIL-MILITARE DICTATORSHIP, AND MEMORY AND CORPORATIVE DOCUMENTATION CENTERS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY From 1964 to 1985, Brazil lived under a dictatorial system of government that according to the latest historiography was sustained largely by civil society (MELO, 2012; COMISSÃO, 2014). More recently, since the 1980s, it is possible to be noticed the growing movement of creation of corporate memory spaces in order to make public the historical trajectory of the companies (COSTA and SARAIVA, 2011). Among these spaces, acquires relevance the Corporate Documentation and Memory Centers, which help to symbolically build the organizational image and to provide a sense of consistency and linear trajectory (RIBEIRO and BARBOSA, 2007). In this context, and based on documentation provided by the National Commission of Truth, this research aims to identify how the History Museum of Bradesco Foundation portrays (or does not portray) the relationship between Bradesco company and the Brazilian government in the period of civil-military dictatorship. (shrink)

Walter Benjamin estudou a configuração da sociedade moderna observando textos literários, como a lírica baudelairiana. Ora, a arte é a primeira a repercutir os fenômenos de seu tempo, estando o artista à vanguarda do pensamento intelectual sistemático. Considerando a arte e a filosofia como formas legítimas de formação do pensamento crítico, buscamos ligar alguns conceitos benjaminianos com a arte moderna, de Camus a Chico Buarque, de Dostoiévski a Belquior.

The aim of this research is to analyze the effects of innovation strategies, Total Quality Management dimensions, and internationalization strategies that Higher Education Institutions might adopt, and their effects on their organizational performance. Due to globalization and the constant changes and demands that have taken place today, HEIs are forced to seek new quality assurance instruments in higher education, to ensure greater competitiveness in the markets and their survival. To examine the association between the independent variables, namely, TQM dimensions, innovation (...) strategies, and internationalization strategies with the dependent variable, that is organizational performance of HEIs, we have chosen to use multiple linear regression analysis. A nine-predictor multiple linear regression model was proposed. The nine predictor variables are Communication, Involvement/teacher empowerment, Development/Teacher training, Continuous improvement, Leadership/Administration’s Commitment, Data analysis/Measurement of results, Focus on students, Innovation Strategies, and Internationalization strategy. We conclude that some TQM variables have a significant association with the organizational performance of HEIs, namely, Involvement/teacher empowerment, and Development/teacher training. On the other hand, also the Innovation strategies and Internationalization strategy have a significant association with the organizational performance of HEIs. This research is of enormous importance for the study of HEIs, considering their role in the development of any country and its impact on society as creators of knowledge and science. Since these institutions increasingly must deal with extremely competitive market environments, knowledge of the factors that can assist in increasing the organizational performance of HEIs is of great relevance. (shrink)

El 24 de marzo de 2016, por medio de la Resolución del Consejo de Ministros n. 21/2016, el Gobierno de Portugal, a través del Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología y Educación Superior, anunció el compromiso de la ciencia con los principios y prácticas de Ciencia abierta. La misma resolución obligó al MCTES a crear un Grupo de Trabajo Interministerial con la misión de presentar una propuesta de Plan Estratégico para la implementación de una Política Nacional de Ciencia Abierta. El grupo de (...) trabajo incluyó cuatro subgrupos: acceso abierto y datos abiertos, infraestructura y preservación digital, evaluación científica y responsabilidad social. En este artículo se presenta el conjunto de recomendaciones que el subgrupo de evaluación científica, en articulación con los demás, considera fundamentales para la implementación de prácticas de ciencia abierta, dirigidas a los agentes políticos, así como a las entidades productoras, evaluadoras y financiadoras de la ciencia. [pt] Em 24 de março de 2016, através da Resolução do Conselho de Ministros nº 21/2016, o Governo de Portugal, através do Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Ensino Superior, anunciou o compromisso da ciência com os princípios e práticas da ciência aberta. A mesma resolução mandata o MCTES a criar um grupo de trabalhointerministerial com a missão de apresentar uma proposta de Plano Estratégico para a implementação de uma Política Nacional de Ciência Aberta. O grupo de trabalho incluiu quatro subgrupos - acesso aberto e dados abertos, infraestruturas e preservação digital, avaliação científica e responsabilidade social científica. Neste artigo apresenta-se o conjunto de recomendações que o subgrupo de avaliação científica, em articulação com os restantes, entende serem fundamentais para a implementação de práticas de ciência aberta dirigindo-se a agentes políticos, bem como a entidades produtoras, avaliadoras e financiadoras de ciência. (shrink)

O presente livro é o relato de um percurso que se foi traçando ao longo de anos a dialogar com Espinosa. Um dos fios que permite estabelecer o encadeamento destes escritos é o das solicitações, académicas ou outras, a que eles correspondem. É uma trama que se entretece com a disposição interna que presidiu à sua escrita - a felicidade de ler e interpretar Espinosa, o filósofo que defende a benignidade das paixões alegres e que se propõe encontrar neste mundo (...) o verdadeiro bem, susceptível de proporcionar 'a fruição eterna da suprema e contínua alegria'. (shrink)

La province jésuite du Brésil est parcourue au début du XVIIe siècle par une série de tensions qui relèvent autant de son rapport à la société coloniale contemporaine que de ses relations avec le centre romain. À travers l'étude d'un document programmatique exceptionnel et original, dont l'auteur et la date de rédaction demeurent inconnus, les Advertências para a provincia do Brasil, on analyse l'inscription de l'entreprise missionnaire dans sa double dimension économicopolitique, avec l'engagement dans la production sucrière, et spirituelle, assurer (...) le salut du missionnaire et la conversion des Indiens. Ce projet, qui fait de l'a ldeia la structure déterminante de la présence et de l'action jésuites en terre de Brésil, révèle une vision globale de la mission, à la fois géopolitique, économique et religieuse que l'historiographie traditionnelle a occultée au profit d'une approche exclusivement spirituelle. (shrink)

According to the simple proposal about rigidity for predicates, a predicate is rigid (roughly) if it signifies the same property across the relevant worlds. Recent critics claim that this suffers from a trivialization problem: any predicate whatsoever would turn out to be trivially rigid, according to the proposal. In this paper a corresponding "problem" for ordinary singular terms is considered. A natural solution is provided by intuitions concerning the actual truth-value of identity statements involving them. The simple proposal for predicates (...) is then defended, by exploiting corresponding intuitions concerning statements involving their nominalizations, in an analogous manner. (shrink)

Reponse to Peter Milne (2005)'s argument agaist maximalism about truthmaking.

Tesis doctoral presentada en el departament de Lògica Història i Filosofia de la Ciencia de la Universitat de Barcelona per optar al títol de Doctor en Filosofia.

The paper proposes and defends the following characterization of response dependent property: a property is response-dependent iff there is a response-dependence biconditional for a concept signifying it which holds in virtue of the nature of the property. Finding out whether a property is such is to a large extent a posteriori matter. Finally, colors are response dependent: they are essentially tied to issuing the relevant experiences, so that having those experiences does give access to their, dispositional, nature. Finally, some important (...) contrary views are critically discussed in the paper. (shrink)

In the recent literature on contextualism and relativism, one often finds disputes as to which kind of consideration would be relevant for positing a feature of a context as a parameter in the ‘‘circumstance of evaluation’: via the presence of an operator in the language which shifts that feature (Stanley) or by being a feature of a context with respect to which the truth of ‘‘propositions’’ expressed in the context is relative (McFarlane). This kind of dispute arises from two different (...) independent roles that elements in ‘‘circumstances of evaluation’’ are sometimes assumed to have. I distinguish indices from points of evaluation, and motivate its significance in the debate. (shrink)

Many domains, notably the one involving predicates of personal taste, present the phenomenon of apparent faultless disagreement. Contextualism is a characteristically moderate implementation of the relativistic attempt to endorse such appearances. According to an often-voiced objection, although it straightforwardly accounts for the faultlessness, contextualism fails to respect “facts about disagreement.” With many other recent contributors to the debate, I contend that the notion of disagreement—“genuine,” “real,” “substantive,” “robust” disagreement—is indeed very flexible, and in particular can be constituted by contrasting attitudes. (...) As such, contextualism is clearly straightforwardly compatible with facts about the existence of disagreement. There is, however, a genuine prima facie worry for contextualism involving facts about the expression of disagreement in ordinary conversations. Elaborating on a suggestion by Lewis :113–138, 1989), I argue that the presupposition of commonality approach in López de Sa shows that there are versions of contextualism that are in good standing vis-à-vis such facts about the expression of disagreement. (shrink)

Th e simple proposal about rigidity for predicates can be stated thus: a predicate is rigid if its canonical nominalization signifi es the same property across the different possible worlds. I have tried elsewhere to defend such a proposal from the trivialization problem, according to which any predicate whatsoever would turn out to be rigid. Benjamin Schnieder (2005) aims fi rst to rebut my argument that some canonical nominalizations can be fl exible, then to provide fi ve arguments to the (...) eff ect that they are all rigid, and fi nally to propose a general explanation of why they are all rigid. I show fi rst why my argument has not been rebutted, then why Schnieder’s fi ve arguments for their rigidity all fail, and fi nally why the alleged “explanation” cannot be such, as the facts alluded to are neutral with respect to the rigidity or fl exibility of the nominalizations. (shrink)

This chapter defends a version of the indexical contextualist form of moderate relativism: the attempt to endorse appearances of faultless disagreement within the framework in which a sentence at a context at the index of the context determines its appropriate truth-value. Many object that any such an indexical proposal would fail to account for intuitions of (genuine) disagreement as revealed in ordinary disputes in the domain. The defence from this objection exploits presuppositions of commonality to the effect that the addressee (...) is relevantly like the speaker of the context. (shrink)

O objetivo deste trabalho é rever criticamente algumas interpretações contemporâneas da noção kantiana de intuição sensível. Defendo uma interpretação alternativa segundo a qual a intuição sensível em Kant deva ser entendida nos termos do que McDowell denomina sentido de re cuja principal característica é a dependênciado objeto. Nesse sentido, a função da intuição sensível é introduzir entidades no discurso para que essas possam ser conceituadas em juízos. Por essa razão,as intuições sensíveis devem ser vistas como o modo de se dar (...) dos objetos e seus atributos e relações que a eles se refere apenas na medida em que eles nos aparecem de forma dependente e relativa. (shrink)

The simple proposal for a characterization of general term rigidity is in terms of sameness of designation in very possible world. Critics like Schwartz (2002) and Soames (2002) have argued that such a proposal would trivialize rigidity for general terms. Martí (2004) claims that the objection rests on the failure to distinguish what is expressed by a general term and the property designated. I argue here against such a response by showing that the trivialization problem reappears even if one pays (...) attention to such a distinction. (shrink)

According to Jackson, Pettit & Smith , “restricted particularism” is not affected by their supervenience-based consideration against particularism but, they claim, suffer from a different difficulty, roughly that it would violate the platitude about moral argument that, in debating controversial moral issues, a central role is played by various similarity claims. I present a defense of “restricted particularism” from this objection, which accommodates the platitudinous character of the claim that ordinary participants in conversations concerning the evaluative are committed to descriptive (...) similarities and differences being relevant in the way described by Jackson, Pettit and Smith, to moral similarities and differences. My defense exploits a presuppositional component congenial to response-dependent proposals such as Lewis’s. (shrink)

Response to Max Kölbel: "A Criterion for Objectivity", Theoria. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia: Volume > 15 > Issue: 2.

Es conocido que Kripke argumentó que la ilusión de contingencia en el caso de la conciencia no puede explicarse del modo en que se explica en el resto de casos familiares de enunciados necesarios a posteriori. En un artículo reciente, Pérez Otero (2002) argumenta que hay una explicación alternativa, en términos de mera aposterioridad. Argumento en contra de la corrección exegética y de la verdad de esta tesis.Kripke famously argued that the illusion of contingency cannot be explained away, in the (...) case of consciousness, in the way it is explained away in the rest of familiar cases of necessary aposteriori statements. In a recent paper, Pérez Otero (2002) argues that there is an alternative way of explaining it a way, in terms of mere aposteriority. I argue against the exegetical accuracy and the truth of this contention. (shrink)

According to the simple proposal, a predicate is rigid iff it signifies the same property across the different possible worlds. The simple proposal has been claimed to suffer from an over-generalization problem. Assume that one can make sense of predicates signifying properties, and assume that trivialization concerns, to the effect that the notion would cover any predicate whatsoever, can be overcome. Still, the proposal would over-generalize, the worry has it, by covering predicates for artifactual, social, or evaluative properties, such as (...) 'is a knife,' 'is a bachelor,' or 'is funny.' In defense, it is argued that rigidity for predicates as characterized plays the appropriate theoretical role, and that the contention that "unnatural" properties are not to be rigidly signified is ungrounded. (shrink)

What different relativist claims about a given domain are to be distinguished? Which of them is best placed to account for intuitive facts about disagreement in that domain? In a recent paper in this journal, ‘Indexical Relativism versus Genuine Relativism’ (2004), Max Kölbel distinguishes two forms of relativism, andargues that one of them, indexical relativism, faces problems in accounting for disagreement. In the first part of this discussion I present my own taxonomy of relativist positions in a given domain, which (...) is based on David Lewis’s 1980 essay, and I compare it with Kölbel’s and other recent suggestions. In the second part, I argue that the presuppositional defence of indexical relativism against related objections that I have elaborated elsewhere is also effective against Kölbel’s recent charges. (shrink)

Consider a cat on a mat. On the one hand, there seems to be just one cat, but on the other there seem to be many things with as good a claim as anything in the vicinity to being a cat. Hence, the problem of the many. In his ‘Many, but Almost One,’ David Lewis offered two solutions. According to the first, only one of the many is indeed a cat, although it is indeterminate exactly which one. According to the (...) second, the many are all cats, but they are almost identical to each other, and hence they are almost one. For Lewis, the two solutions do not compete with each other but are mutually complementary, as each one can assist the other. This paper has two aims: to give some reasons against the first of these two solutions, but then to defend the second as a self-standing solution from Lewis’s considerations to the contrary. (shrink)

The article considers the development of the concept of war in four stages. State Wars: wars between morally equal sovereign states. Democratic Wars of Peoples: defence and self-determination wars. Humanitarian Wars: “just wars” fought in the name of mankind and justice against an enemy considered as an unhuman criminal. Star Wars: the “war on terror” that tries to circumscribe the most extreme violence inside enemy territory, to be closed as if it would be a “star”.

Resumo: Neste trabalho discute-se a crítica de István Mészáros à Lógica de Hegel. Aponta-se como o marxismo realiza a crítica aos pontos de partida e de chegada da Ciência da lógica, quais sejam, o pensamento sem pressupostos e o círculo auto-constituído da Lógica. Com isso, indica-se a diferença entre os modos hegeliano e marxista de conceber o enraizamento do conhecimento no processo de vida real. Discute-se ainda como István Mészáros realizou uma dura crítica à hipostasiação do método dialético em G. (...) Lukács, crítica esta que se apóia na rejeição de um método que deixa de prestar contas ao ser e que, por isso, acaba lidando com a identidade entre conhecimento e ser como uma mera postulação abstrata.: This paper discusses István Mészáros critique of Hegel’s Logic. We point out how Marxism criticizes the presuppositionless thinkingand self-constituted circle of reasoning of the Science of logic. We thereby show the difference between the Hegelian and Marxist ways of conceiving the rooting of knowledge in the process of real life. We also discuss how Mészáros made a scathing critique of the hypostatization of dialectical method in Lukács work. This critique is based on the rejection of a method that fails to be accountable to the real world and therefore ends up treating the identity of knowledge and being as a mere abstract postulation. (shrink)

Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006) argues against attempts to preserve the entailment principle (or a restriction of it) while avoiding the explosion of truthmakers for necessities and truthmaker triviality. In doing so, he both defends the disjunction thesis--if something makes true a disjunctive truth, then it makes true one of its disjuncts--, and rejects the conjunction thesis--if something makes tue a conjunctive truth, then it makes true each of its conjuncts. In my discussion, I provide plausible counterexamples to the disjunction thesis, and (...) contend that Rodriguez-Pereyra's general defence of it fails. Then I defend the conjunction thesis from Rodriguez-Pereyra's case against it. (shrink)

We say that each social group is identical to its members. The group just is them; they just are the group. This view of groups as pluralities has tended to be swiftly rejected by social metaphysicians, if considered at all, mainly on the basis of two objections. First, it is argued that groups can change in membership, while pluralities cannot. Second, it is argued that different groups can have exactly the same members, while different pluralities cannot. We rebut these objections, (...) and argue that our plural view is superior to alternative reductive proposals which would identify social groups with the sets or fusions of their members. Finally we deal with some further potential challenges for the view of groups as pluralities. Thus we aim to establish it as a serious contender in the metaphysics of groups. (shrink)

There are certain metaphysically interesting arguments ‘from vagueness’, for unrestricted mereological composition and for four-dimensionalism, which involve a claim to the effect that idioms for unrestricted quantification are precise. An elaboration of Lewis’ argument for this claim, which assumes the view of vagueness as semantic indecision, is presented. It is argued that the argument also works according to other views on the nature of vagueness, which also require for an expression to be vague that there are different admissible alternatives of (...) the relevant sort, such as epistemicism, as defended by Williamson. Recent attempts to resist the argument are discussed and rejected. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to critically review several interpretations of Kantian sensible intuition. The first interpretation is the recent construal of Kantian sensible intuition as a mental analogue of a direct referential term. The second is the old, widespread assumption that Kantian intuitions do not refer to mind-independent entities, such as bodies and their physical properties, unless they are brought under categories. The third is the assumption that, by referring to mind-independent entities, sensible intuitions represent objectively in the (...) sense that they represent in a relative, perspective-independent manner. The fourth is the construal of Kantian sensible intuitions as non-conceptual content. In this paper, I support the alternative view that Kantian sensible representation is to be seen as iconic de re presentation of objects without representational content. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction Relativism and Apparent Faultless Disagreement The Many Relativisms: Moderate vs. Radical Moderate Relativisms: Indexical vs. Non ‐ indexical Contextualism Radical Relativism: Content vs. Truth Relativism The Many “Relativism”s References.

Tyler Burge (2010) provided a scathing critique of all programs for naturalizing concepts of representation, especially teleological naturalizing programs. He tended to demonstrate that “representational content” is a concept that cannot be reduced to more fundamental biological or physical ideas. According to him, since the 1970s, the concept of representational content has been firmly established in cognitive psychology as a mature science and utilized inadequate explanations. Since Dretske’s program is Burge’s primary objective, this paper concentrates on Dretske’s perspective. Following Burge’s (...) criticisms, I concur that Dretske’s naturalizing program trivializes the complex concept of representational content in cognitive science by applying it to bacteria, protozoa, etc. There is a superior explanation, namely Burge’s alternative idea of “registering information.” I do not believe, however, that this spells the end of naturalization programs. There is no reason to deny that at least some biological functions entail representational capacities with perceptual constancy, if not all. Cases of genuine perception, representing the accurate distal causes of proximal stimuli under various conditions, contribute to fitness. It is not by accident that representational content plays a role in cases of genuine perception. Consequently, I will argue that accuracy and biological fitness cannot be separated. (shrink)

In recent years, some people have held that a radical relativist position is defensible in some philosophically interesting cases, including future contingents, predicates of personal taste, evaluative predicates in general, epistemic modals, and knowledge attributions. The position is frequently characterized as denying that utterance-truth is absolute. I argue that this characterization is inappropriate, as it requires a metaphysical substantive contention with which moderate views as such need not be committed. Before this, I also offer a more basic, admittedly less exciting (...) alternative characterization of the position, in terms of departing from the Kaplan–Lewis–Stalnaker two-dimensional framework. (shrink)

The focus of this paper is Cassirer’s Neo-Kantian reading of Kant’s conception of unity of space. Cassirer’s neo-Kantian reading is largely in conformity with the mainstream of intellectualist Kant-scholars, which is unsurprising, given his own intellectualist view of space and perception and his rejection of the existence of a ‘merely sensory consciousness’ as a ‘formless mass of impression’. I argue against Cassirer’s reading by relying on a Kantian distinction first recognized by Heinrich Rickert, a neo-Kantian from the Southwest school, between (...) Kenntnis (roughly knowledge by acquaintance) and Erkenntnis (roughly propositional knowledge). Correspondingly, I claim that concepts and categories are conditions for Erkenntnis of objects as such, namely for thinking of and apprehending the pre-existing unity as an object, rather than for the ‘constitution’ of this very unity. (shrink)

In recent discussions on contextualism and relativism, some have suggested that audience-sensitivity motivates a content relativist version of radical relativism, according to which a sentence as said at a context can have different contents with respect to the different perspectives from where it is assessed. The first aim of this note is to illustrate how this is not so. According to Egan himself, the phenomenon motivates at least refinement of the characteristic moderate contention that features of a single context determine (...) the appropriate truth-value of the sentence. The second aim of this note is to explore how this may not be so. (shrink)

This essay aims to expose the metaphysical underpinnings of enactivism. While enactivism relies heavily on rejecting the traditional mind-body problem by excluding the familiar thought experiments that favor phenomenal dualism, the crucial point that is overlooked is instead the brain-body problem, specifically the crucial interaction between the brain and the bodily limbs in their embodied activities of perception and cognition. If enactivism is correct, differences in sensory experience necessarily entail differences in embodied activity—this is the metaphysical core of enactivism, which (...) we think is entirely wrong. We will argue that a physical or biological body ("Körper") is configured or shaped into a perceptually living body ("Leib") by brain patterns and not by embodied activity or by the so-called sensorimotor contingencies. Undoubtedly, embodied actions influence sensory perception. However, since variations in embodied actions do not necessarily lead to variations in sensory experience, they are not metaphysically constitutive of these experiences (supervenience claim). (shrink)